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Abstract 
 
The inclusion of non-ipsative measures of party preference (in essence ratings for 
each of the parties of a political system) has become established practice in mass surveys 
conducted for election studies. They exist in different forms, known as thermometer 
ratings or feeling scores, likes and dislikes scores, or support propensities. Usually only 
one of these is included in a single survey, which makes it difficult to assess the relative 
merits of each. The questionnaire of the Irish National Election Study 2002 (INES2002) 
contained three different batteries of non-ipsative party preferences. This paper 
investigates some of the properties of these different indicators. We focus in particular on 
two phenomena. First, the relationship between non-ipsative preferences and the choices 
actually made on the ballot. In Ireland this relationship is more revealing than in most 
other countries owing to the electoral system (STV) which allows voters to cast multiple 
ordered votes for candidates from different parties. Second, we investigate the latent 
structure of each of the batteries of party preferences and the relationships between them. 
 We conclude that the three instruments are not interchangeable, that they measure 
different orientations, and that one –the propensity to vote for a party– is by far preferable 
if the purpose of the study is the explanation of voters’ actual choice behaviour. This 
finding has important ramifications for the design of election study questionnaires. 
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 3 
Introduction and theoretical framework 
 
Election study surveys commonly include some kind of question about the respondent’s 
preference for each of the various parties in a country. One of the best known examples 
of such a question is the thermometer scale pioneered in the American National Election 
Studies –and subsequently used in election studies in many other countries. The 
respondent is invited to indicate for a set of political parties, and often also for sets of 
other stimuli such as candidates or social groups, how favourable or unfavourable their 
feelings are, and to express this on a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 indicates unfavourable 
or ‘cold’ feelings and 100 favourable or ‘warm’ ones. Similar questions have emerged in 
other surveys, apparently trying to elicit the same kind of preferences by way of 
somewhat different phrasing of the question, or by different response formats. In the 
absence of comparative studies of the merits of different forms of measuring such non-
ipsative preferences,1 the choice of which one to use in a particular study seems to be 
largely a matter of personal taste or happenstance. In some instances, choice of 
instrument is even dictated by external ‘authorities’, as in the case in the CSES project 
that imposes a particular format on its participants.2 Yet, there too, no firm evidence 
about properties and performance of various instruments underlies that decree. This is 
unfortunate, as numerous studies demonstrate that variations in the wording and response 
formats of survey questions can have considerable effect on characteristics of the 
resulting measurements in terms of ease of response, bias, reliability and validity. Not 
every variation on a common theme is equally ‘good’ as a measurement instrument. This 
paper investigates the ‘performance’ of three different formats in which non-ipsative 
party preferences are asked in election studies, in the hope of making choice of 
measurement instruments less a matter of taste and more a matter of evidence.  
What makes a measurement instrument a ‘good’ one, or a ‘better’ one when 
compared to a different instrument purportedly measuring the same phenomenon? One 
can consider in this respect two kinds of criteria: technical and substantive. ‘Technical’ 
criteria to evaluate the merits of survey questions relate to properties such as  
• Coverage: the extent to which respondents in a representative sample are 
willing and able to give valid responses.  
                                                
1 Preferences are called ipsative if they are constrained to a fixed-sum rule. In most countries, electoral 
choice is ipsative, as the voter is only allowed to express a single preference on the ballot –voting for one 
party thus implies not-voting for each of the other options. Ranked preferences are ipsative in a different 
way: having indicated which of a series of stimuli is preferred most necessitates that other stimuli are 
ranked lower, etc. In all these cases, the preferences for the various stimuli or choice options are thus not 
mutually independent, because of their fixed-sum constraint. In the case of non-ipsative preferences, a 
respondent expresses a degree of preference for each of the options, where the response given for one of the 
options does not in any way constrain the responses allowed for other options. Most often, non-ipsative 
preferences are elicited in the form of preference ratings for the various options.  
2 The CSES –Comparative Study of Electoral Systems– is an invaluable and ambitious attempt to increase 
comparability of elections by insertion of a standardized block of questions in the election studies of all 
participating countries. The project is currently running its 3rd module. In modules 1 and 2 the number of 
participating countries was 34 and 38 respectively, while 56 countries have indicated their intention to 
participate in round 3. For more details about the project and the data that it has generated, see 
http://www.cses.org. The particular form of non-ipsative party preferences imposed by the CSES in 
Module 2 asks respondents to rate parties on a scale from 0 (‘strongly dislike’) to 10 (‘strongly like’). 
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• Discrimination: the extent to which the distribution of responses allows 
the comparison of different groups of sufficient size. Heavily skewed 
response distributions thus permit little discrimination, irrespective of the 
number of response options, while uniform or even normal distributions 
permit, ceteris paribus, more discrimination. 
• Reliability: the response stability over-time under conditions of no change 
in the true scores.  
• Equivalence of meaning of the instrument across stimuli and across groups 
of respondents 
In this paper we will look at coverage and equivalence of meaning; we lack the 
necessary over-time data for adequate reliability assessment, and the relevance of the 
discrimination criterion is conditional on the assessment of substantive criteria have been 
assessed.  
Substantive criteria for evaluating measurement instruments relate to concept 
validity. They thus require a conceptual explication of what the instrument was intended 
to measure and, subsequently, a theoretical explication of what observable differences 
would be between more and less valid instruments. This brings us to the question what it 
is that non-ipsative party preferences are supposed to measure. In view of the widespread 
and varied usage that is made of election study data, there is, of course, no single 
authoritative account of the concepts that the various non-ipsative party preference 
measures are purported to measure. One could, of course, revert to a form of 
operationalism that states that questions that ask about ‘feelings’ measure just that, while 
other questions measure something else, such as the extent to which one likes or dislikes 
parties. That is unsatisfactory and tautological, however, unless the concepts of feelings 
or likes/dislikes are theoretically explicated in such a way as to allow an empirical 
assessment of the extent to which specific instruments do tap the concept in question.  
When looking at the analytical usage of non-ipsative party preferences in the 
literature, it is quite clear that most authors –usually implicitly– interpret them as 
expressions of the over-all electoral attractiveness of parties. The work by Rabinowitz, 
McDonald and their various collaborators (cf. Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989, 
MacDonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz 1991), for example, derives conclusions about 
directional voting from analyses of thermometer ratings. The logic of their analysis rests 
on the assumption that –apart from random error– the party that is given the highest 
preference score is the one that will actually be voted for (voting itself being an ipsative 
form of preference).3 Although –again– usually not explicated, this interpretation of the 
meaning of non-ipsative preference measures coincides with Downs’ (1957) concept of 
‘party utility’ (the benefits – subjective or objective – that a voter gets from voting for a 
particular party). Indeed, the term party utility, in this sense of the word, is often used 
interchangeably with that of (non-ipsative) party preferences (how strongly parties are 
preferred in relation to each other). Downs argues that voters cast their ballot for the party 
they prefer most, i.e., the party that is to them the most attractive to vote for, and which, 
in other words, has the highest utility. 4 This implies a tautological relationship between 
                                                
3 Surprisingly, this assumption is never tested by these authors, although the information to do so is directly 
available to them. 
4 Downs’ conceptual elaboration of the utility concept is particularly of definitional relevance. It does not 
lead, however, to falsifiable theories about voting unless no restrictions are placed on the kind of 
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the most preferred party (the party yielding the highest utility) on the one hand and party 
choice on the other. This tautology is actually quite useful. As Bingham Powell (2000: 
160) argues so eloquently, choice –an ipsative expression of preferences– does not tell us 
enough about voter preferences to adequately understand electoral behaviour, but the 
additional information that is required for that purpose is contained in non-ipsative 
preferences (utilities). This Downsian conceptual foundation yields an immediate 
observable criterion by which different operationalisations can be distinguished in terms 
of their concept validity: the extent to which the party chosen is also the party a voter 
prefers most strongly.  
The distinction between utilities (non-ipsative preferences) and discrete choice 
implies a two-stage model of electoral choice, as illustrated in Figure 1, below. The first  
 
Figure 1: The two-stage model of electoral choice 
 
 
 
stage involves the development of utilities; the second stage involves the transformation 
of non-ipsative utilities in ipsative choice, generally by utility-maximization. The unique 
advantages of such a two-stage model in the analysis of a variety of electoral phenomena 
have been elaborated elsewhere (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; van der Eijk et al. 2006; 
van der Brug et al. 2007a). In the present context it suffices to derive from this conceptual 
foundation the (empirically assessable) criterion for concept validity that actual choice 
coincides with highest preference. We will focus in detail on the performance of three 
different measures of non-ipsative preferences in this respect. But before we can present 
those analyses, we first need to introduce the data, and the specific context in which they 
have been collected.  
 
 
Data, measures and context  
 
The source of our data is the Irish National Election Study (INES) of 2002 (see Marsh et 
al. 2008). The study was funded under the Programme for Research in Third Level 
Institutions (PRTLI). This project was co-directed by Michael Marsh and Richard Sinnott 
(UCD). The survey was conducted by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) 
                                                                                                                                            
considerations that are admissible as determinants of utility [insert references]. It will be evident that in our 
case the tautological perspective is of relevance and that we have no stake whatsoever in the kind of 
restrictions on utility determinants that many analysts have used in order to arrive at falsifiable theories. 
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after the election using face-to-face interviews. A three-stage clustered sampling 
approach was used for sample selection. In the first instance a random sample of 220 
PSUs (Primary Sampling Units) was selected from 3,400 District Electoral Divisions 
(DEDs). All 42 constituencies were sampled as part of this process. In the second, a 
random sample of 25 households was selected from within each of the PSUs. In the third 
a random person within the household was selected using the ‘next-birthday’ rule. No 
non-sample replacement methods were used. No letter was sent to the respondent prior to 
the study and there were no payments or gifts used. However, as an incentive, 
respondents were entered into a lottery, which had eight prizes. Each household was 
contacted up to five times in order to obtain a respondent and interview. Interviews 
started a few days after the election and 20 percent were completed within the first 
month, and two-thirds within two months, 90 percent were completed within two and a 
half months and almost every interview was carried out within 4 months. For full details 
of the methodology see Marsh et al 2008; but see also Laver 2005; Marsh 2004, 2006b, 
2007. 
The INES data are of particular interest for at least two reasons. First, the 
questionnaire that was used contains three different non-ipsative preference measures, 
thus allowing rare possibilities for a comparative assessment of the concept validity of 
each. Second, the Irish electoral system offers more, and more demanding elaborations of 
the utility-maximizing criterion than most other electoral systems.  
 
Three measures of non-ipsative party preferences 
The questionnaire of the INES contains 3 sets of non-ipsative preference questions. One 
of these is the ‘classic’ feeling thermometer that derives from the tradition of American 
National Election Studies. The question is used for politicians, parties, as well as for the 
candidates in the voter’s constituency: 
 
I’d like to ask you how you feel about some Irish politicians, using what we call the ‘feeling 
thermometer’. The feeling thermometer works like this: If you have a favourable feeling (a 
warm feeling) towards a POLITICIAN you should place him/her somewhere between 50 
and 100 degrees; If you have a unfavourable feeling (a warm feeling) towards a 
POLITICIAN you should place him/her somewhere between 0 and 50 degrees; if you have 
a don’t feel particularly warm or cold (have no feeling towards the politician at all) then 
you should place him/her somewhere at 50 degrees; where would you place these Irish 
politicians? And where would you place each of the following PARTIES; and where would 
you place these CANDIDATES who ran in your constituency in the general election in May?  
 
The second set of non-ipsative preference questions is also asked for politicians 
(i.e., the national leaders of the major parties) as well as for parties. These questions 
follow the formulation and format prescribed by the CSES (see also footnote 2). For the 
political parties this question reads as follows: 
 
I’d like to know what you think about each of our political parties. Please rate each party 
on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you STRONGLY DISLIKE that party and 10 means 
that you STRONGLY LIKE that party. If you come to a party you haven’t heard of or you feel 
you do not know enough about, just put a tick (a) in the ‘Don’t know’ box on the right. 
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This question was not included in the questionnaire for the main face-to-face interview 
component of the INES, but in a drop-off self-completion questionnaire that was given to 
respondents after the main interview, with the request to complete it and mail it in.  
The third set of questions probing non-ipsative preferences for parties derives was 
originally developed by van der Eijk and Niemöller in the early 1980s for the Dutch 
national election studies (van der Eijk and Niemöller 1984; DPES 1982). It has been used 
in all Dutch national election studies since 1982, in all European Election Studies since 
1989, and in a growing number of election studies in European countries, including 
Britain, Germany, and Spain. This formulation of this so-called ‘propensity to vote’ 
(PTV) question is:  
 
We have a number of political parties in Ireland each of which would like to get your vote. 
How probable is it that you will ever give your first preference vote to the following parties? 
Please use the numbers on this scale to indicate your views, where ‘1’means ‘not at all 
probable’ and ‘10’ means ‘very probable’.  
 
Each of these questions about party preferences was asked for the 6 main Irish 
parties: Fianna Fáil (FF), Fine Gael (FG), Greens (Gr), Labour (Lab), Progressive 
Democrats (PDs) and Sinn Fein (SF). In addition, the propensity to vote question was 
also asked for ‘an Independent candidate’. The three sets of questions were separated by 
significant intervals so as to minimize risk of response set. Nevertheless, it is not unlikely 
that respondents are increasingly primed into a party evaluation frame of mind as the 
interview progresses, which should make it easier for them to respond (and respond 
consistently) to later party preference questions. It is therefore relevant to mention that 
the propensity to vote questions were the first non-ipsative preference questions in the 
questionnaire with the thermometer questions–on party leaders, on parties and then 
candidates – shortly after.5 The final set of likes/dislikes question came much later, in the 
final drop-off section of the questionnaire. This section was completed by 89 per cent of 
respondents. 6  
The INES is unique in having included all three different forms of these questions 
in the same study. Most election studies select only one of them for inclusion, which 
makes it virtually impossible to make a comparative assessment of the ‘performance’ of 
each.7  
 
Institutional context: voting under STV 
Ireland uses the single transferable vote system. Voters are presented with a ballot that 
contains the names –and photographs– of the candidates in their constituency, and the 
party affiliation of those candidates. Voting consists of indicating a preference ranking 
for as many candidates as one wants. Figure 2 illustrates this in the form of a completed 
ballot on which 4 preferences are marked out of a total of 16 candidates listed on the 
                                                
5 The questionnaire was a split one. For a random half of the sample, the intervening questions were open 
ended ones about what each party stood for; the other half were asked to place each party’s position on both 
a scale of attitudes to the EU and a scale on environmental protection. 
6 Many of these were completed as part of the normal interview and other collected later by the interviewer. 
A number were also posted back to the ESRI.  
7 The Dutch national election studies has occasionally included the thermometer scale in addition to the 
propensity to support question, thus also allowing some comparisons of the characteristics of the respective 
items.  
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ballot paper. Voters know that their votes are never ‘wasted’ as the allocation of seats 
redistributes votes that are not required for winning a seat to other candidates according 
to the patterns of lower preferences marked on the ballot. Additional complexity is 
generated by the fact that parties may field more than one candidate in a given 
constituency, while at the same time not always having candidates on the ballot in all 
constituencies. As a case in point, in 2002 the PDs did not field a candidate in 25 of the 
42 constituencies, which were populated by almost 60% of the Irish electorate. 
Obviously, such no-shows occur particularly in areas where a party expects its support to 
be too small to warrant investment of scarce resources. As the geographical distribution 
of party support is different for the various parties, the particular combination of choice 
options available to voters may differ from constituency to constituency. Just under one 
third of all voters could choose between candidates of all parties and a further third again 
were faced with this set, minus a PDs candidates. Apart from these two combinations, the 
options were varied, with SF fielding candidates in only 34/42 constituencies, Greens in 
30/42, Labour in 39/42. A final relevant detail is that also independent candidates 
compete for votes in all but three constituencies, and not without success.8  
The variety of availability, and the variety of ways in which voters may use their 
preferences has to be kept in mind when analyzing and interpreting our survey data. In 
contrast to election surveys from many other countries we cannot simply look at party 
choice, but rather we have to distinguish 1st preference votes from 2nd preference votes 
and from lower ones. Even when examining simple party choice in most political 
systems, the question arises whether that single expression of preference is a sincere one. 
This is also the case with the more sophisticated expression of preference under STV. 
However, the most common reason for casting an insincere preference in other electoral 
systems – the fear of ‘wasting’ a vote – is not a rational one within STV, as unused votes 
are transferred to other candidates, as indicated by lower preference votes. Arguably the 
need for coalitions could undermine sincere preferences, since the coalition partners a 
party might prefer, or require, might not be those that would be chosen by all of its 
supporters. However, it could be argued that the uncertainty about post-coalition options 
is normally so great as to make it very difficult for any voter to know how to use lower 
preferences to maximise the chance of her preferred party being in government (See 
Laver 2000 for some discussion of this.)  
Finally, it is to some extent an open question whether Irish voters actually vote for 
parties (who field candidates), or for candidates (most of whom happen to be associated 
with a party). It is widely assumed that candidate factors are of great importance in 
Ireland, yet exactly how important candidate and party factors are vis-à-vis each other is 
still very much a matter of debate (for a more elaborate discussion, see, e.g., Marsh 2007; 
Marsh et al 2008 Chapter 8). However, it does appear that, to a considerable degree, 
candidate and party loyalties coexist: if a voter likes a candidate, she likes that party and 
vice versa. The debate is essentially about how often the party is the chicken and how 
often it is the egg in this process. Even when a voter indicates support for multiple 
candidates of the same party, the order of preferences for these candidates cannot simply 
be assumed to reflect her candidate preferences. Parties who run more than one candidate 
often to try to ensure support is balanced across these candidates, and will sometimes ask  
                                                
8 In 2002 the number of Independent candidates was 95 nationwide, who amassed 9.5% of first preference 
votes nationwide, and 13 of whom were elected (total size of the Dáil is 166 representatives).  
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Figure 2: Irish 2002 ballot with 4 preference votes marked 
 
supporters in an area to vote for particular candidates. Therefore they instruct their 
followers in great specificity as to how to order their preferences over candidates, as 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Segment from Fine Gael election flyer, instructing voters how to order their 
votes (see areas indicated by ellipses) 
 
 
Performance of different non-ipsative preference measures 
 
Our discussion of the institutional context within which voters make their choices in 
Ireland may help to illuminate some of the complexities involved in analysing electoral 
choice in Ireland. These complexities relate particularly to the interpretation of choices as 
driven by candidate or by party factors, and thus to our analysis of the construct validity 
of the three different preference measures by way of the criterion of maximum-preference 
choice. Before we engage in those analyses, however, we first report a much simpler 
comparison of the performance of the three measures: the extent to which our 
interviewees are willing and able to respond to them.  
 
Inability or unwillingness to respond  
When looking at the content of the three sets of questions, we see no a priori reasons for 
differences in the percentages of respondents who are unwilling or unable to provide an 
answer. If we were to have any expectations at all, it would be that questions asked later 
in the interview would yield lower non-response, on account of the respondents having 
been longer socialised into their role, and having been more extensively primed into a 
mindset of evaluating parties. Yet, other studies often do reveal systematic differences in 
non-response that could not be deduced on the basis of first principles from a visual or 
linguistic inspection of the questions involved. As a case in point, a comparison of 
thermometer ratings and propensity to vote scores in the Dutch National Election Study 
yields a considerably higher incidence of nonresponse in the former (cf. Kroh 2001). 
When assessing the three instruments in the INES in this respect we limit the comparison 
to only those respondents who completed the drop-off questionnaire (n=2367) –as the 
like-dislike instrument was part of that questionnaire. Table 1 provides the proportions of 
nonresponse for each of the parties separately, as well as in a listwise fashion.  
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Table 1: Proportion of nonresponse to three measures of non-ipsative party preferences. 
 Data: INES2002, n=2367 
 
 FF FG Green Labour PDs SF Indep Listwise 
PTV 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Thermometer 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 inap 0.05 
Like/Dislike 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.15 inap 0.21 
 
Table 1 shows that the propensity to vote measure (PTV) generates the least 
nonresponse, even listwise, while it is asked for 7 stimuli, in contrast to the other two 
measures which are only asked for 6. The feeling thermometer yields consistently more 
nonresponse than the PTVs, although the difference is small (and smaller than in the case 
of a similar comparison in the Dutch National Election Study). The largest difference we 
find, however, between PTVs and thermometer scores on the one hand, and the 
like/dislike scores on the other. It is not entirely clear whether this difference can only be 
attributed to the instrument itself. Part of it may be caused by a different mode of data 
collection (face-to-face for PTVs and thermometer, self-completion drop-off 
questionnaire for the likes/dislike scale). Additionally, we see a slight tendency for 
smaller parties to generate somewhat higher proportions of nonresponse, but, over-all, the 
main conclusion must be that non-ipsative preference questions do not pose insuperable 
cognitive or emotive barriers to interviewees. 
A more challenging –and substantively more interesting– assessment of the relative 
merits of these questions concerns their relationship with the actual choices made by 
voters on the ballot. That is what we turn to now.  
 
Relationships between non-ipsative preferences and actual choice 
As discussed earlier, non-ipsative preferences for parties are used in the literature as 
measures of the electoral attractiveness of parties or of what Downs (1957) calls 
‘electoral utilities’ – although it has to be emphasised that most authors are hardly 
explicit with respect to their conceptual interpretation of these instruments. In the case of 
valid measures of that concept, knowledge of which party received a voter’s highest 
preference score does not yield anything new over and above his/her report of which 
party was actually supported on the ballot.9 The two are –conceptually– identical. The 
major advantage of valid non-ipsative preference questions is something else: they shed 
light on a structure of preferences that remains in the dark if the only information at our 
disposal is ipsative preference in the form of vote choice (cf Bingham Powell 2000:160). 
And that information is invaluable for improving explanatory models of party choice (cf 
van der Brug et al. 2007a), for studying party competition (cf van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 
1991; Kroh et al. 2007) and the determinants of the support of small parties (cf. Van der 
Brug et al 2000) and various other phenomena in the field of electoral studies (for a fuller 
discussion, see van der Eijk et al. 2006).  
From this conceptual background we can deduce a simple and straightforward 
criterion for construct validity: highest preferences should coincide with choice. When 
                                                
9 The only additional information that can be derived from a valid highest preference score is how someone 
who did not vote would have voted had he/she turned out to vote.  
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applying this criterion to the Irish case a number of complications arises that derive from 
the specific institutional setting of Irish elections, as summarised earlier. Should we look 
at first preference vote or at all preference votes? How do we take the differences into 
account in the availability of choice options on the ballot? How do we distinguish 
between instances of candidate voting and instances of party voting that are 
indistinguishable in terms of their manifestation on the ballot? And, finally, how can we 
prevent the results from being influenced artefactually by differences in response format 
–particularly the difference between a 0-100 scale in the thermometer instrument, and a 
much shorter scale for the other instruments (1-10 for PTVs, 0-10 for likes/dislikes). 
To keep the degree of complexity manageable we decided to investigate this 
criterion first with respect to the first preference vote, and only thereafter for any lower 
preference vote that involves a different party than the one getting the first preference 
vote.10  
Secondly, we decided to present the results of our analyses using two different 
ways of handling the differences in the electoral supply side. On the one hand we 
disregard the problem and conduct our analyses on all respondents who completed the 
drop-off questionnaire, and on the other hand we select a relatively small segment of the 
sample consisting of the voters in those constituencies where a full slate of choice options 
was available (i.e., the 6 major parties listed earlier and one or more independent 
candidates). This segment consists of 845 respondents (slightly more than 30% of the 
realised sample).11 We did look into all intermediate situations, i.e., constituencies where 
only PDs were missing, or only Labour, or where the ballot contained neither a Green nor 
an Independent, etc. Presenting results for all those conditions separately serves no 
purpose as the results turn out to be exceedingly similar, as is illustrated by the two 
extreme cases that we do present. 
Third, in order to tighten the interpretation of the results in terms of whether they 
are reflect candidate voting or party voting, we differentiate voters in that respect. We 
make use of a 3-fold typology that distinguishes candidate-oriented voters, party oriented 
ones, and a group with mixed orientations. This typology was developed by Marsh et al 
(2007, Chapter 8) and is based on responses to 2 questions, one whether respondents 
consider party or candidate to be the most important factor determining their choice, and 
the second whether or not they would still vote for the same candidate if (s)he were to 
switch to a different party.12 We expect that the most-preferred party will more often be 
                                                
10 Keep in mind that the second party voted for does not have to be same as the party of the second 
preference vote. Parties can have more than one candidate in the same district, which makes it possible that 
first and second preference vote involve the same party, in which case the results in terms of relationship 
between choice and non-ipsative preference will be the same. Instead, we are interested in the first other 
party that is supported after that of the first preference vote (if any).  
11 Not all of these are useful observations for the analyses to follow. A sizeable portion of this group did not 
vote; a small number did vote but for one of the few minor parties (Christian Democrats, Workers Party, 
etc.) for which we have no preference ratings, some voted for independent candidates for whom we have no 
thermometer or like/dislike scores. Owing to these factors, the number of valid observations in Table 2 
varies somewhat for the different instruments.  
12 We do not believe that self-attributions of motivations constitute a fully adequate basis for classifying 
people into party- or candidate-oriented groups (see, e.g., Kaplan 1964 on the distinction between act 
meaning and action meaning). Yet we think it plausible that to the extent that such differences in 
orientations exist amongst voters, they will be correlated with these self-attributions. 
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different from the one actually chosen for candidate-oriented voters when compared to 
party-oriented voters.  
Finally, we decided to look at the thermometer scale in its original (0-100) form, as 
well as in a recoded 10-category form, in order not to bias our assessment of the 
thermometer instrument downwards as minor random differences are more likely to 
result in a deviation from maximum-preference voting when using a much larger number 
of categories.  
The results of our analyses can be summarised in a set of percentages that display 
how often the most preferred party is the same as the party of the first preference vote. 
This is reported in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Percentages of highest-preference voting for different measurement instruments  
and different groups of voters 
Data: INES2002; valid N: 1466-1643 (left panel), 450-502 (right panel); see also 
footnote 9. 
 
 Disregarding differences in party supply Only constituencies with full party supply  
  PTV 
 
Thermo- 
meter 
 
Therm. 
recoded 
 
Like /  
dislike 
 
PTV 
 
Thermo- 
meter 
 
Therm. 
recoded 
 
Like / 
dislike 
 
Candidate-orient- 
ed voters 
 
82.0 
 
59.6 
 
60.7 
 
73.4 
 
81.2 
 
57.3 
 
58.9 
 
72.4 
 
Voters with mixed 
ortientations 
 
87.5 
 
66.3 
 
67.4 
 
86.1 
 
88.3 
 
67.0 
 
70.0 
 
83.9 
 
Party-oriented  
voters 
 
 
94.5 
 
70.5 
 
70.7 
 
92.1 
 
90.6 
 
66.7 
 
67.7 
 
89.5 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
87.1 
 
64.9 
 
65.7 
 
82.9 
 
86.5 
 
63.6 
 
65.6 
 
81.6 
 
Inspection of Table 2 shows, first of all, that it makes very little difference whether 
or not we take account of the supply of parties from which voters can choose. 
Disregarding this aspect (left panel of Table 2) unavoidably leads to a number of false 
negatives: voters seen as not voting for their most preferred party only because that party 
was not present on their ballot. The minimal differences between the left panel and the 
right one (where no false negatives can possibly occur, as voters can choose from all 
parties for which they expressed preferences – see also footnote 9) indicates on the one 
hand that parties are quite astute in not fielding candidates in areas where their support is 
minimal. On the other hand, it also may indicate a tendency of voters to develop 
preferences only for choice options that are actually available to them, which would 
imply that – in the long run – parties stand to gain from being present on the ballot in as 
many constituencies as they can manage. 
The next conclusion that can be drawn from Table 2 is that there are considerable 
differences in the extent to which the three instruments stand up against the criterion that 
the most preferred party should be the same as the one actually chosen. For the entire 
groups of voters for whom we can make this assessment, as well as for each of the three 
subgroups, we find that PTVs perform in this respect much better than the other two 
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instruments. The like/dislike format does considerably better than the thermometer 
scores. When comparing the three instruments, it should be kept in mind that the criterion 
of highest preference voting becomes – ceteris paribus – more demanding as the number 
of options increases. In the case of the PTVs this criterion is based on 7 options (6 parties 
plus Independents), whereas only 6 options underlie this test of the other two instruments.  
The incidence of highest preference voting is –as expected– highest among party-
oriented voters. Yet, the PTV measure, in particular, shows that even candidate-oriented 
voters behave mostly (in excess of 80%) in a party-driven fashion: voting for the party 
that has their highest preference. This is not to deny that candidates may also be 
important, but it illustrates the weakness of typologies of candidate – versus party-
orientation that are based on self-assessments (see also footnote 10). The question 
remains, of course, whether party preferences are driven by candidate preferences, or the 
other way around, or whether party and candidate preferences affect each other 
reciprocally. Yet, interesting as these observations may be, they are somewhat beside the 
remit of this paper, which is to make a comparative assessment of three different 
instruments for measuring the electoral attractiveness of parties by way of non-ipsative 
preference measures. As far as that central question is concerned, the results so far point 
unequivocally to the PTV as the most valid of the three instruments. This assessment is 
based, however, on first preference votes only. Earlier we allowed that the STV system 
offers the possibility of rational, party-driven preference voting that does not manifest 
itself in first preference votes, but rather in lower preference votes. Our assessment of the 
performance of the three instruments is therefore not yet complete, and we will turn to 
lower preference votes next. 
 
Non-ipsative preferences and lower preference votes 
Comparing lower preference votes with party preferences only makes sense when the 
lower preference vote involves a different party than the first preference vote, as 
otherwise we simply duplicate earlier findings. This restriction leads to the loss of some 
cases: respondents who did not give any of their lower preference votes to a candidate of 
a different party, or if they did, voted for one of the minor ‘other’ parties for which we 
have no preference ratings. 13 
In view of the great similarity of the findings in the left and right panels of Table 2 we 
limit the presentation of findings only to those respondents who are offered a full party 
supply in their constituency. Moreover, we cannot restrict ourselves just to reporting the 
percentage of cases where the relevant higher preference vote is for the party that was 
given the highest rating score. That would misrepresent the relationship between the non-
ipsative preferences (ratings) and actual lower preference choices. Obviously, when the 
first preference vote is for the party that was given the highest rating score, we cannot 
find the same relationship anymore for a lower preference vote  – except when the two 
parties involved are tied at highest rating score. We rather have to assess in that case 
whether or not the next party chosen is the one that was given the next highest rating, and 
so on. In view of this we have to distinguish a number of possible relationships between 
preferences and choice, as displayed in Table 3.  
 
                                                
13  Only 1 per cent of or sample supported such a party as their second (party) choice and less than 1 per 
cent did so as a first choice. 
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Table 3: Relationship between non-ipsative preference and lower preference vote while 
taking into account the same relationship for first preference vote (percentages) 
Data: INES2002 
 
 PTV Thermometer Like/dislike 
Category 1: 2nd party best 5.5 3.2 6.1 
Category 2: 2nd party tied for best with first 28.5 10.4 13.1 
Category 3: 2nd party next best after 1st 33.0 28.0 36.9 
Category 4: 2nd party better than first but not best 0.00 9.3 6.6 
Category 5: 2nd party not best after 1st 33.0 49.1 37.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sum of categories 2 and 3 61.5 38.4 50.0 
valid N 397 279 244 
Selected sample section (N) 401 401 401 
valid N as % of selection 99.0 69.6 60.8 
 
Category 1 in Table 3 consists of those respondents for whom their second party vote 
for is cast for the party to which they gave the highest preference, while the party of the 
first preference vote was given the next highest preference rating. At first sight this seems 
to defy the notion of voting according to highest preference, but it is not necessarily the 
case. Earlier we mentioned that desires additional to who should get elected may in the 
STV setting lead to strategically giving the first preference vote to a party that is not the 
most preferred, and a higher preference vote to the party that is best in terms of 
preference. Yet, whether or not this is actually the case is unknown to us, so that we have 
to consider this category as equivocal in terms of our assessment of highest utility voting 
for lower preference votes.  
Category 2 describes respondents who had given their highest preference rating to 
both parties, so that both manifest highest preference voting. The magnitude of this 
category indicates that ties at highest preference are relatively common, particularly in 
the PTV measure.  
The third category in Table 3 is the straightforward situation where preference votes 
follow the order of non-tied preference ratings: the second party chosen is the next 
highest in terms of rankings. A clear and unequivocal manifestation of highest utility 
voting. 
Category 4 manifests a clear refutation of highest-rating voting. Neither of the two 
parties chosen is best in terms of non-ipsative preference ratings. It is conceivable that 
these respondents have given a yet lower preference vote to a third party that is the best 
in this respect. In that case they do not refute highest preference voting. Yet, as we will 
see, the incidence of highest-preference voting seems to be lower in lower preference 
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votes than in first preference votes, which makes it unlikely that this category would 
contain many false refutations, particularly also in view of the small size of this category. 
Category 5, finally, manifests situations where the second party voted for defies the 
utility-maximization criterion, although this does not imply that the same holds for the 
party of the first preference vote.  
In our view, categories 2 and 3 both reflect situations in which a second party chosen 
follows the utility-maximization criterion. The total of these 2 categories is indicated in 
Table 3 for each of the three instruments. The PTV measure here also performs 
considerably better in this respect than either of the other two measures. Yet, even when 
using the PTV measure, and disregarding the ambiguous category 1, in more than one 
third of the instances in which a second party is chosen in a lower preference vote the 
party utility-maximising rule is violated, a much higher percentage then we found for first 
preference votes. This may indicate different things. One possibility is that the first 
preference vote is the one that really expresses party preference, while subsequent choice 
of parties represents something else 
A second possibility, already mentioned, is that apparent refutations of highest-utility 
voting are caused by the fact that we have not included all subsequent preference votes in 
our analysis. We think that it is unlikely that extending the analyses to further parties 
chosen would change the picture over much. One reason for this is the decreasing number 
of voters who express on the ballot support for a third, or even a fourth or yet further 
party. The second reason is that extending the analysis to third and further parties chosen 
carries an increasing risk of non-falsifiable, hence trivial propositions. Those few voters 
who rank all candidates (and thus also all parties in their constituency) on their ballot will 
by necessity have voted for the parties that yield them maximum utility, second-best 
utility, etc.  
A final aspect of relevance in Table 3 concerns the last rows, which indicate the 
extent to which the relevant segment of the sample is ‘covered’ by each of the three 
preference measures. The large difference that we see here is partly attributable to the 
fact that the PTVs cover 7 choice options, and the other two measures only 6 options. But 
in addition they also reflect differences in non-response. It is important to keep track of 
this coverage, as good performance of a measure –a high incidence of utility-maximizing 
voting— loses much of its relevance if the measure is inapplicable to large groups in a 
population (or representative sample of that population).  
Reviewing the findings of this together with the previous section in the light of our 
main concern – how do the three non-ipsative preference measures fare in terms of 
construct validity– we can only conclude that the PTV measure outperforms thermometer 
scores as well as like/dislike scores by a wide margin. Does this imply that the other two 
measures are less valid as measures of the electoral attractiveness of parties? That 
question cannot be answered on the basis of our analyses so far. It is quite conceivable 
that, for example, all three measures are equally valid yet differ in terms of the amount of 
noise they contain. This question is partly one of reliability, but also partly one of latent 
structure. As stated earlier, we cannot unequivocally address reliability issues because of 
lack of replications under circumstances of no latent change.14 However, if all three 
                                                
14 The sample of the INES2002 study has been re-interviewed almost annually up to an including 2007. The 
long period between repeated observations makes the assumption of no latent change –a necessary 
assumption to deduce reliability from observed stability– implausible. Elsewhere we will use this panel 
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instruments are valid measures of the same concept, they are congeneric in the 
psychometric sense of the word. And the available data allow us to test whether or not 
this is the case, by using latent structure analysis.  
 
 
Latent structure analysis of non-ipsative preferences 
 
If the three rating measures of non-ipsative preferences measure the same phenomenon, 
they should be congeneric or homogenous. Although this is a common notion – widely 
applied in various forms of latent structure analysis of, e.g., attitude items – it is less self-
evident what this implies for our current measures. In contrast to many other applications 
of the same reasoning, we are here interested in the homogeneity of instruments that are 
not single items, but sets each consisting of multiple items. When considering each of the 
instruments in isolation, we can analyse its items in order to diagnose the latent structure 
underlying them. That latent structure is usually interpreted in a dimensional sense. If all 
items of an instrument can be shown to express a single latent variable, then they can all 
be considered to be equally valid as expressions of – in our case – over-all electoral 
attractiveness, or electoral utility in the Downsian sense of the word. If one or several 
items do not (or do not sufficiently strongly) reflect the same latent trait as the others, 
then the non-ipsative instrument in question may be valid for some parties, but not for 
others. This does not necessarily lead to serious violations of the utility-maximizing rule 
used as criterion for construct validation in the previous sections, particularly not when 
the ‘deviant’ party is small.  
We can thus extend our assessment of construct validity of the three measurement 
instruments by analysing each in terms of the commensurability of the observations with 
a single latent trait. But, more interestingly, we can use latent structure analysis also to 
investigate whether the three instruments all measure the same underlying structure, by 
jointly analysing the items of each. If the three instruments measure the same thing, then 
we should find that they all express the same underlying dimension. In that case, the 
differences in performance according top the utility-maximization criterion used in the 
previous sections would seem to be mainly attributable to differences in ‘noise’ or 
reliability.  
What model to use for assessing latent structure depends on the character of the 
items. In our case, each item expresses a similarity relationship between a voter and a 
party. In other words, they constitute a particular kind of single stimulus data (Coombs 
1964). Moreover, as we cannot expect the items to be located at the same position in the 
latent space, factor analytic methods are inappropriate (cf. van Schuur 1993; van Schuur 
and Kiers 1994). Models of the IRT (Item Response Theory) tradition are more suitable 
for these data. We will use the nonparametric unfolding model MUDFOLD, as it does not 
require us to buy into various kinds of assumptions that are either implausible or that 
appear arbitrary in the context of our data.  
As do all unfolding models, MUDFOLD attempts to construct a single representation 
of both persons and stimuli in a latent space. Both should be located in this so-called joint 
space so that the distances between persons and stimuli reflect (inversely) the empirically 
                                                                                                                                            
information for specifying models that estimate change and reliability simultaneously, but such analyses 
are beyond the scope of the present paper.  
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observed preferences of each person individually: the more a respondent prefers a party, 
the smaller the distance between them should be in the spatial representation. Formally, 
this amounts to the assumption of single-peaked preferences. These relations should hold 
to a satisfactory degree for all voters and for all parties. An interesting aspect of such 
representations –if they exist– is that they demonstrate that all respondents use largely the 
same criterion in rating all of the parties.  
MUDFOLD provides a goodness-of-fit measure – the coefficient of homogeneity H– 
which can be used to compare the strength of a scale across instruments and subgroups. H 
attains an upper limit of 1 if the constructed scale represents the data perfectly, without 
any violations. If, on the other hand, a proposed scale yields as many violations with 
empirical observations as would occur in the case of statistical independence of the 
stimuli, H is 0. Generally, the lower boundary for acceptable scalability of survey data is 
set at H=0.30. H-values surpassing 0.40 indicate a medium-strong scale, and above 0.50 a 
strong scale. In addition to the H coefficient for a scale in its entirety, item-specific 
coefficients –Hi– indicate how well each of the items fits in a given scale.  
 
Unfolding PTV ratings of parties 
The unfolding analysis of the 7 PTV items yields a medium strong scale, as reported in 
Table 4.15 The table reports the order of the parties in the underlying latent dimension, 
and the degree of scalability of the set of items as a whole (H=0.40) and for each of the 
parties as part of this scale (Hi).  
 The order that was found to represent the observed preferences best is: 
 
FF / PDs / FG / Independent / Labour / Greens / SF16 
 
Voters are located on the same dimension, and as the model is based on the assumption 
of single-peaked preference functions, this order implies voters who have expressed a  
 
Table 4: Unfolding scale of PTV ratings of Irish political parties and Independents 
Data: INES2002         
 
 Hi (parties 
H (scale) 
FF 0.38 
PDs 0.44 
FG 0.36 
Independent 0.37 
Labour  0.44 
Greens 0.44 
SF 0.41 
Scale 0.40 
 
                                                
15 In order to avoid comparability problems owing to different rates of nonresponse, we conducted the all 
unfolding analyses on the group of respondents who gave valid responses to all items of all three non-
ipsative party preference instruments (N=1801).  
16 This is the ordering also found by analysis of PTVs in another survey conducted in 2001-2002. For this 
and orderings from earlier years see Marsh 2006a. 
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high preference for a particular party tend to also have relatively high preferences for 
parties that are adjacent in this ordering, and increasingly lower  preferences for parties 
that are further removed. The fit of the unfolding model for these data is quite acceptable, 
although the Hi’s indicate that preferences for FF, FG and Independents generate 
somewhat more violations of the model than preferences for the other parties do. We 
find, however, that these perturbances are to some extent caused by the inclusion of the 
‘Independent’ stimulus. This is not surprising in view of considerable differences in 
outlooks and policy emphases between independent candidates. Replicating the analysis 
for only the 6 parties –leaving out Independents– yields a scale with the same ordering, 
and slightly stronger scalability, as reported in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Unfolding scale of PTV ratings of Irish political parties 
Data: INES2002      
 
 Hi (parties 
H (scale) 
FF 0.38 
PDs 0.46 
FG 0.40 
Labour  0.45 
Greens 0.48 
SF 0.34 
Scale 0.42 
 
Table 5 shows that SF is the weakest item in terms of scalability, although it still fits 
acceptably in the scale. This suggests that PTV-preferences expressed for SF either 
contain somewhat more random noise that is the case for other parties, or express, to a 
small extent, something other than (or additional to) electoral utility. The drop in 
scalability is not, however, of such a magnitude that we should conclude that PTV-
preferences expressed for SF have to be interpreted in a different light as those given to 
other parties.  
 
Unfolding of Thermometer and Like/Dislike ratings of parties 
Similar analyses as for the PTV ratings were done for the thermometer and like/dislike 
ratings. The results are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 5. The ordering in  
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Table 6: Unfolding scale of Thermometer ratings and Like/Dislike ratings 
Data: INES2002       
 
 Thermometer 
Hi (parties 
H (scale) 
Like/Dislike 
Hi (parties 
H (scale) 
FF 0.38 0.33 
PDs 0.45 0.42 
FG 0.39 0.36 
Labour  0.45 0.42 
Greens 0.37 0.41 
SF 0.30 0.35 
Scale 0.39 0.38 
 
which parties are unfoldable is the same, and both the thermometer and the like/dislike 
ratings are scalable at an acceptable level. Yet, each of these sets of preference ratings is 
slightly weaker in its structure than the PTV unfolding scale, and the Hi of the 
thermometer rating of SF is only borderline acceptable.  
 
Unfolding all non-ipsative party preference ratings jointly 
The somewhat weaker scalability of the thermometer and the like/dislike ratings – when 
compared to the PTV ratings – can conceivably be caused by higher levels of random 
error or noise. If that were the case, it would also explain the poorer performance of those 
two measurement instruments in terms of reflecting utility-maximising choice behaviour 
(see previous section, Tables 2 and 3) and it would indicate that, although they are not all 
equally accurate, all three instruments for measuring non-ipsative preferences are valid 
and that they measure the same phenomenon: the electoral attractiveness of parties.  
A test of the hypothesis that all three measurement instruments measure the same 
thing consists of jointly unfolding the items of PTV, thermometer and like/dislike ratings. 
The results of a large series of variations of such a test can be summarised extremely 
concisely: the hypothesis that these measurement instruments are congeneric is 
resoundingly rejected. Using any of the three scales reported in Tables 5 and 6 as starting 
point and attempting to extend that scale by acceptable items from the other instruments 
fails. Sometimes one or two items can be added to an original scale –at the cost of a 
considerable loss of structure, as expressed in the H coefficient– but never more. Forcing 
the items of any two (let alone of all three) of the instruments into a single scale results 
invariably in dramatically low H coefficients.  
 The conclusion of these failed attempts at finding a shared latent structure across 
the three measurements can only be that they do not measure the same thing. Warm and 
cold feelings as expressed in a thermometer scale do not express the same thing as do 
expressed propensities to vote for a party, nor as expressed like/dislike ratings.  
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Conclusion and implications  
 
We argued that non-ipsative preference ratings are of great importance for the 
development of better explanatory models of electoral behaviour and choice. But this 
holds only if such preference ratings are valid operationalisations of the electoral 
attractiveness of political parties, i.e. of what Downs refers to as electoral utilities.  
Different traditions of measuring non-ipsative preferences exist. Yet, because 
most studies reflect only a single one of these, comparative assessments of their 
respective merits have been hampered. The Irish National Election Study 2002, however, 
includes three different of such preference questions: thermometer ratings, like/dislike 
ratings, and propensity to vote for party ratings. We use these data for a comparative 
analysis of the validity of these measures as operationalisations of the concept of 
electoral utility. The application of these measures in the Irish context also allows more 
stringent assessments of their performance than would be possible in many other 
countries, as the STV electoral system permits voters to cast multiple, ordered choices, 
and thus allows more sophisticated comparisons between actual choices on the one hand 
and preference ratings on the other.  
Considerations of construct validity require that, for a measure to be valid as an 
operationalisation of electoral utility, it must display the tautological relationship between 
highest preference rating (in conceptual terms: highest utility) and actual party choice. 
This ‘highest utility’ criterion was clearly best fulfilled by the propensity ratings, with a 
success rate of 86.5% (using party chosen in STV first preference vote), versus 81.6% for 
the like/dislike ratings and only some 65% for the thermometer ratings. When looking at 
the correspondence between non-ipsative preference ratings and other parties chosen in 
lower preference votes under STV we find again that the propensity scale is much better 
able to capture utility-maximisation in choice than either of the other two measures. Yet, 
the success rate is considerably lower than in the case of first preference voting, partly 
because of unavoidable ambiguity in the interpretation of some patterns of STV’s first 
and lower preference votes.   
Each of the measures of non-ipsative preferences was asked for all 6 of the Irish 
parties represented by more than one deputy in the 2002-2007 parliament, while the 
propensity scale also includes a rating for ‘Independents’. When investigating the internal 
structure of the responses to each of these batteries of party preferences separately, we 
find that they express underlying uni-dimensional structures, each of which orders the 
parties in the same way. This desirable property of each of the batteries is slightly more 
pronounced for the propensity items than for the thermometer or like/dislike ratings. Yet, 
when all non-ipsative preference ratings from all three instruments are subjected to a 
common analysis, they defy being combined in an acceptable unfolding scale. Evidently, 
although the underlying factors that are expressed in the responses to each of the batteries 
of items are related, they are not identical.17 This leads, in combination with the 
                                                
17 From the unfolding algorithm a score can be calculated that represents respondents’ positions on the 
underlying continuum. Unsurprisingly, the scores on these latent variables are significantly correlated. The 
strongest correlations are found between the PTV-based score and each of the other scores (0.66 and 0.62 
respectively), whereas the scores on the latent dimensions expressed in thermometer and like/dislike ratings 
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performance of the three batteries on the ‘highest utility’ criterion to the conclusion that 
the propensity ratings are the most valid measurements of the intended concept –the 
electoral attractiveness of parties or, in Downsian terms, electoral utility. The other 
measures express something that is related to this, yet different from it. One could, of 
course, ask what it is that is expressed by those other instruments. We will not engage in 
that question for two reasons. First, the purpose of this paper was to assess the relative 
merits of three different operationalisations of the same concept. That we have done. 
Second, we feel it is not rewarding to engage in a social science dating enterprise where 
“nice operationalisation seeks compatible concept”. In explicatory analyses of electoral 
choice, there is a strong need for valid non-ipsative measures of electoral utility. The 
analyses in this paper have indicated that such a measure exists. Having established that, 
it is time to leave the field of instrumentation and enter that of instrument-application, 
i.e., substantive explanations, of electoral choice.  
The excellent performance of the propensity measure does not come as a total 
surprise, as it has earlier been demonstrated to generate a success rate in excess of 90% 
on the highest utility criterion in most European countries (cf. Van der Eijk et al 1996; 
Van der Eijk et al. 1999; Van der Brug et al. 2007b). Most of those analyses pertained to 
the second-order national elections for the European Parliament, but Dutch national 
election data showed that the measure also performs very well in first-order contexts 
(Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1984; Tillie 1995). Those earlier findings, however, were 
mostly unable to assess the merits of the other non-ipsative preference measures that 
were analysed here. The only earlier comparison between instruments that we are aware 
of was done by Kroh (2001), who systematically compared the performance of 
thermometer ratings and propensity ratings in the Netherlands. His conclusions mirror 
ours: thermometer ratings are much more loosely connected to actual party choice than 
are propensity ratings, and therefore are much less adequate as measures of the electoral 
attractiveness of political parties.18 It might be more surprising that such a strong link is 
found between propensity rating and party choice in the Irish context, as there is so much 
evidence that Irish voters are apparently less party centred than voters in most other 
countries. However, these findings make it clear than even if voters are drawn to a party 
via a candidate, they still tend to vote for that party which has the highest utility rating, 
and moreover, such voters tend to give their second (party) preference to the next most 
highly rated party. 
At least two general implications of our findings deserve specific mention, one 
analytical, and one with respect to data collection. The analytical implication of our 
findings is that researchers who utilise thermometer ratings (e.g., in ANES data) or 
like/dislike ratings (in CSES data) must be aware of the considerable slippage between 
these ratings and actual choice. As a consequence, to the extent that their inferences about 
                                                                                                                                            
are intercorrelated at 0.57. Although these correlations are of a respectable magnitude, they also indicate 
that the shared variance of respondents’ positions on these latent variables ranges somewhere between 0.32 
and 0.43, which leaves ample room for mutually incompatible meaning components. In a later publication 
we will use these scores in a more elaborate latent-variable model explicating the relationships between 
these and other central variables in the explanation of electoral choice.  
18 Using data from the 1994 Dutch Parliamentary Ele4ction Study he finds that 72.6% of the respondents 
vote according to the highest rating on the thermometer measure, while the corresponding percentage for 
the propensity rating was 94.6. 
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choice behaviour are based upon analysis of thermometer or like/dislike ratings they run 
considerable risks. 
The implication with respect to data collection is that the decision as to to which of 
several measures of non-ipsative party preferences to include in a survey cannot anymore 
be made innocently on the basis of personal taste or even continuity considerations. In the 
presence of empirical evidence about stark differences in the validity of different 
measures the only sensible choice is to include the best measure in election surveys. The 
best –in the present comparison clearly the propensity ratings– is not more difficult or 
more expensive to implement than inferior instruments. There is no excuse for choosing 
second rate instruments.  
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